|22 mayo, 2018|
|12:30 pm||a||2:00 pm|
Speaker: Greys Sosic, USC Marshall School of Business, USA
Title: Incentives and Emission Responsibility Allocation in Supply Chains
Date: 22 de May. 12:30 h.
Location: Sala de Seminarios (Edificio Torretamarit)
Abstract: In view of the urgency and challenges of mitigating climate change, it should be noted that Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emitted from the supply chains of the 2,500 largest global corporations accounts for about 18% of global GHG emissions. Therefore, rationalizing emissions in supply chains could make a significant contribution to achieving the CO2 emission reduction targets recently agreed upon in Paris (Paris Agreement, 2015).
In this paper we consider supply chains with motivated dominant leaders, such as Walmart, who strive to reduce emissions in their supply chains. These supply chain leaders are assumed to be knowledgeable about causes of pollution in their supply chains, to the extent that they are able to assign their suppliers responsibilities for both direct and indirect GHG emissions in the supply chain. Given these pollution responsibility assignments, we use cooperative game theory methodology to derive a scheme for allocating the responsibilities of the total GHG emissions to the firms in the supply chain.
The allocation scheme that we derive, which is the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game, is shown to have several desirable properties. In particular, (i) it is footprint-balanced, (ii) it is transparent and easy to compute, (iii) it lends itself to several intuitive and insightful axiomatic characterizations, and (iv) when the abatement cost functions of the firms are private information, it is shown to incentivize suppliers to exert pollution abatement efforts that, among all footprint-balanced allocation schemes, minimize the maximum deviation from the socially optimal pollution level.