Encarnación Algaba (University of Sevilla), Sylvain Béal (University Bourgogne Franche-Comté), Vito Fragnelli (University of Eastern Piedmont), Natividad Llorca (University Miguel Hernández of Elche) and Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano (University Miguel Hernández of Elche).
Abstract. We study the relationship between cooperative games which arise from very different situations. On the one hand, the labeled network game which is defined to study how to allocate a certain flow in a network among agents that control different parts of the network. On the other hand, the museum pass game which is defined to analyze how to distribute the profit generated by passes which provide visitors unlimited access to the participating museums. We establish that both problems are related in the sense that a museum pass game can be written as a labeled network game and almost all labeled network games can be written as museum pass games. We also point out that these classes of games
can be related to other classes of games, for which we provide a generic interpretation in terms of attributes and population.
Keywords. Game theory; Labeled network games; Museum pass games; Shapley value; Attribute situations; Approval voting.