30 noviembre, 2020
12:00 pm

Título:   On Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in a Duopolistic Market Share Model

Ponente: Francesco Ciardiello (Sheffield University Management School)

Organizador: Ana Meca

Fecha: Lunes 30 de noviembre de 2020 a las 12:00


ABSTRACT: This paper develops a duopolistic discounted marketing model with linear advertising costs and advertised prices for mature markets still in expansion. Generic and predatory advertising effects are combined together in the model. We characterize a class of adver- tising models with some lowered production costs. For such a class of models, advertising investments have a no-free-riding strict Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if discount rates are small. We discuss the entity of this efficiency at varying parameters of our advertising model. We provide a computational framework in which market shares can be computed at equilibrium, too. We analyze market share dynamics for an asymmetrical numerical scenario where one of the two firms is more effective in generic and predatory advertising. Several numerical insights on market share dynamics are obtained. Our computational framework allows for different scenarios in practical applications and it is developed, thanks to Mathematica software.